That's a cool idea and I think that would work well with what I usually recommend.... which is to implement GPO based FWs and block 445 inbound, except from a jump box or from a small subnet of IPs.
I know 445 can also be used for installing software remotely, but again, that could be accomplished by only allowing inbound 445 from a subset of the network/jump box.
I've personally had a difficult time getting people to implement client-side firewall changes. There's always a ton of push-back. I don't know if the sys admins just aren't as comfortable on the network side or what the deal is, but something that should be simple always seems to break everything. That's definitely a good strategy when implemented properly though.
With the network logon GPO, there's a corresponding one that disallows RDP for specified users, which is necessary since that's treated as an interactive logon, not a network logon. On the attacking side, that obviously requires cracking the hash instead of passing it, but it's not like that doesn't happen frequently
Again, disabling the service or client-side firewalls could address that as well. I guess a blanket GPO is a good safety net.
I was recently at a client that implemented something really cool called CyberArk, ever heard of it? It changes the local admin passwords to crazy random passwords, every hour! It keeps track of all of them and allows SSO through the CyberArk. Bad ass!
I've never used it personally, but it's one I suggest be researched for anyone looking at enterprise password management. I saw one that did something similar, but it only changed after it was checked out by a user, effectively providing one-time passwords. The ManageEngine utility looks promising too. It even supports multi-factor, so you need a phone or RSA token in order to check out passwords.