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1  Ethical Hacking Discussions and Related Certifications / Hardware / Re: IronKey a joke ! Lets put it to the test! on: June 02, 2009, 05:23:06 AM
1) An IK is only secure "at rest" - i.e. when not plugged into and authenticated on a host. Data is passed in clear across the host USB bus *then* encrypted by the IK.

2) Each IK has a unique serial number etched onto it. No serial number, no key-escrow. Although diagnostic (IK Support) probing of ROM would likely reveal serial number anyway.

3) The length of time taken to user-initialize a new IK is very quick. Does anyone remember how long PGP used to take to generate key-pairs on a host with a substantially faster CPU? It is probable therefore that Key-Pairs are likely installed post assembly. See point (2) above.

4) The Identity Manager (updated) is very good, but auto-archives all info to the "secure IK vaults". This option cannot be disabled it seems. How secure are the vaults?

Overall a very, very useable product. I've implemented IK's both corporately and recommend them privately; for the money and overall security they provided they're as good as anything else out there.

If an IK is used to store anything that becomes of interest to the State, then none of the points raised above become relevant. Google "Camp Delta/Xray".

If one deems the Risk, Probability and Impact of any data/information interception high enough, then ensuring that the host any IK is plugged into is "secure" is essential.

My suggestion:

1) Use VMware to create a VM machine, preferably Linux. Clone it.
2) Install/use Truecrypt within the VM clone to create container file as secure as desired. Use multiple key files, stored on a secondary USB device, in addition to a *lengthy* password. Fill container with "data". www.truecrypt.org
3) Move Truecrypt container to IK. Data is thus encrypted *before* it hits the host USB bus.
4) Shutdown VM clone. Securely Wipe Clone from disk.
5) Start over.

Admin heavy yes, but prevents as best as possible key-recovery and interception of clear data crossing the USB bus to the IK. Even if the target Host/IK become compromised (within reason) data is still held securely within (potentially) the now quadruply encrypted Truecrypt container.

Effort Expended = Results Gained.

IMHO

TM

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